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Abstract
Recovering from unanticipated disasters is critical in today’s global market. This pa-
per examines the effectiveness of popular recovery strategies used to address unpredictable
disasters that derail supply chains. We create a formal model to portray dynamic oper-
ational performance among supply chain firms facing disruptions caused by natural and
man-made disasters. Our analysis shows that a supply chain recovers best if member firms
adopt a radical, rapid, costly recovery strategy that immediately resolves the disruption.
This observation is robust to various resource consumption requirements. We apply our
methodology in the case of Taiwan’s 2011 food contamination scandal and provide man-
agerial insights.
Keywords: Emergency management, supply chain disruptions, supply chain vulnerability,
cellular automata, complex adaptive systems
1 Introduction
Today’s global business landscape is characterized by increasing uncertainty and vulnerabili-
ties. Recent years have brought unforeseeable disasters – man-made and natural – including
terrorist attacks, computer viruses and ‘hackings’, financial crises, earthquakes, tsunamis, the
SARS and Ebola epidemics, and nuclear reactor accidents, etc. Anecdotal evidence about
the global production plummet due to Japan’s March 2011 earthquake and nuclear reactor
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semi-meltdown shows that most serious, unpredictable disasters can disrupt the normal flow
of goods and materials within and across supply chains. Such unpredictable disasters expose
firms enormous operational and financial risks (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Papadakis, 2006;
Xiao and Yu, 2006; Bueo-Solano and Cedillo-Campos, 2014). Motivated by these real-world
observations this paper examines the effectiveness of popular recovery strategies when a supply
chain faces unpredictable, hazardous events, and then provides managerial insights for supply
chain managers.
Historical data indicate that the total number of natural and man-made disasters has soared
dramatically over the last two decades (see e.g., www.cred.be; www.munichre.com). For in-
stance, Thailand’s 2011 massive flooding affected the supply chains of computer manufacturers
dependent on hard disk drives and of Japanese auto companies including Honda, Toyota, and
Nissan with factories in Thailand (BBC, 13/10/2011), among others. The 2010 eruption of an
Icelandic volcano caused flight disruptions across Europe that severely affected supply chains
dependent on air-freighted imports and exports, such as food and flowers. BMW had to suspend
auto production at three plants in Germany due to the parts supply interruptions resulting from
this volcanic eruption (DailyMail, 19/04/2010). Empirical studies indicate that most supply
chains tend to collapse during disruptions caused by major unanticipated disasters and many
of them never recover afterwards (e.g., Eskew, 2004; Tang, 2006). The detrimental effects of
various catastrophic disasters (Hendricks and Singhal, 2005; Green et al., 2011) motivate us
to identify robust supply chain strategies that promptly and effectively address them – strate-
gies enable supply chains to maintain their operations during and closely after disaster-caused
disruptions.
To explore supply chain dynamics in the presence of major disasters, we construct a behav-
ioral supply chain model using the cellular automata (CA), a simulation method that considers
strategic interaction among neighboring firms and the resultant impact on the entire supply
chain (Davis et al., 2007; Harrison et al., 2007; Nair et al., 2009; Yang and Chandra, 2013).
Using the aforementioned floods in Thailand and the volcano eruption in Iceland as examples,
we employ CA to model how an unanticipated disaster in a supply chain firm places the entire
supply chain’s operational and financial performance at risk, following the forest fire model
in physical science (see Robertson and Caldart, 2008). In essence, our model mirrors many
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real-world supply chain disruption cases.
Research that explores ways to mitigate supply chain disruptions has generally followed one
of two streams: disruptions caused by anticipated and unanticipated disasters. In practice, a
supply chain frequently faces disruptions with anticipated probability of occurrence and mag-
nitude of impact, due to forecast errors caused by demand fluctuations, machine breakdown,
and poor supplier performance (e.g., Hilletofth and Hilmola, 2008; La¨ttila¨ and Saranen, 2011).
The first stream, anticipated disaster-caused disruptions, suggests that the disruption’s adverse
impact can be mitigated by taking steps to diminish the likelihood of a disruption (e.g., Chang
et al., 2007); on this, Altay and Green (2006) offer a comprehensive literature survey. However,
how can a firm reduce the chance of a disruption if the probability distribution of the hazards
is unknowable, such as those caused by unpredictable, sudden-onset natural and man-made
disasters? The first stream of research cannot address this thorny problem, which is important
in global supply chain management of product production ranging from airplanes to consumer
goods to chemicals (Sheffi, 2007; Simchi-Levi et al., 2014). But the second stream of research,
unanticipated disaster-caused disruptions, attempts to address this problem of unforeseeable
incidents.
In the past decade, managers of supply chains and operations have become much more con-
cerned about the potential consequences of unanticipated disasters at their facilities and those
of their supply chain partners (Sheu, 2007b; Kunz and Reiner, 2012). The increased concern is
partly the result of greater inter- and intra-organizational complexity and increased exposure
to unpredictable natural and man-made disasters. For instance, meteorologists are forecasting
increased weather events – in terms of severity and incidence rates – due to global warm-
ing. These events will inevitably disrupt supply chains because shipping, air freight, trains,
and other transportation modes along with fuel shortages, communication and electricity out-
ages and electricity supply supply disruptions, will be greatly affected by increasingly extreme
weather events. As noted earlier, in 2011 Honda had to cut its car production at six plants
and postponed new model launches in the US and Europe due to a shortage of electrical and
engine components from suppliers in flood-stricken Thailand; Kenyan farmers who relied on
air-freighted exports to Europe had to destroy over 400 tons of flowers after two days of flights
cancellations due to the eruption of an Icelandic volcano; and Japan’s 2011 earthquake and
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tsunami halted Toyota’s production at three plants for several days and damaged American
dealerships (see Chopra and Sodhi (2004, 2014) for more details and examples).
To address the practitioners’ and researchers’ increased concern about unanticipated disas-
ters, a second stream of research has recently emerged that explores the role of supply chain
disruptions caused by unpredictable natural and man-made disasters (Sheu, 2007a). For in-
stance, Bueno-Solano and Cedillo-Campos (2014) develop a system dynamics model to analyze
the devastating effects of terrorist acts on global supply chain performance. Qi et al. (2004)
examine a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain experiencing demand disruptions and the re-
sultant impacts on supply chain’s coordination mechanisms in pursuit of maximum supply chain
performance. Xiao and Qi (2008) extend Qi et al.’s (2004) analysis of a one-manufacturer-two-
competing-retailers supply chain under disruption. However, most studies in this stream explore
the effects of supply chain disruptions but fail to consider recovery strategies – the major focus
of this work (see, Altay and Green, 2006; Sheu, 2010). We extend this research stream by devel-
oping a formal model of supply chain dynamics under unanticipated disasters and their effects
on member firms over time. Also, we summarize several observations by carefully analyzing
extensive simulation outcomes.
Our key findings are as follows. An incremental recovery strategy mitigates disruptions from
unanticipated disasters by incrementally improving the supply chain’s recovery performance;
this strategy performs well when bringing the entire supply chain operations from a poor to
good state consumes considerable resources. However, with the incremental recovery strategy,
the supply chain may not perform as well as expected if the above condition – high resource
consumption requirement – does not hold. As Lee (2004) highlights, a good supply chain
strategy for recovery must perform at “triple-A” job by employing agility, adaptability, and
alignment. Our computational analysis demonstrates that a radical (the most rapid) recovery
strategy – one that contains the impact of a disaster within the effected firms and strives
to immediately fix the disruption – is most robust. That is, in most disruptive cases, the
radical recovery strategy consistently performs reliably. In contrast, strategies using the state-
of-immediate-neighbors as a reference point are not as effective as the radical strategy to inhibit
the contagion effect of disasters across the supply chain, leading to relatively low recovery
performance. Their lack of efficiency is more significant when the supply chain is relatively
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large (e.g., the supply chain has ten echelons). These findings and insights under the supply
chain structure generally hold in a stochastic setting in which a firm’s recovery strategy is
altered over time and in an extended supply network structure where each member firm has
multiple upstream and downstream neighbors. We describe those conditions and strategies in
detail, and justify these insights and other results in subsequent sections.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model characteristics. Section
3 reports on a computational analysis to explore our model. Two extensions of the model –
the stochastic setting and the supply network structure setting – are discussed in Section 4.
Section 5 illustrates the validation of the proposed model in a recent real-world case. Section
6 summarizes our findings and develops several theoretical observations for future empirical
research.
2 Model
While our model encompasses a wide range of technical systems (e.g., information systems,
manufacturing processes), we focus on supply chains. A long tradition in the model-based
literature on operations, supply chain, and organization (see, Cachon and Netessine, 2004; Davis
et al., 2007; Harrison et al., 2007) leads us to conceptualize the supply chain as the interaction
of all member firms each of which makes a number of interdependent decisions. Specifically,
each firm follows its strategy to interact with its adjacent upstream and downstream neighbor
firms; together their unique interactions influence the supply chain’s overall performance.
2.1 Supply chain structure
In modeling a supply chain’s evolution, the cellular automata (CA) framework assumes that
each firm interacts within a supply chain following fixed, homogeneous rules. Since a supply
chain consists of autonomous or semiautonomous business entities (i.e., firms) engaged in vari-
ous independent and interdependent activities, CA is an ideal research methodology to explore
supply-chain issues (Nair et al., 2009). The firms in our model populate a one-dimensional
array; consider a supply chain in which every firm interacts with its adjacent upstream and
downstream neighbors. (We extend this chain structure into a network structure in Section
4.2, where each firm has multiple upstream and downstream neighbors.) We refer to N as the
size of the supply chain; thus N firms populate the supply chain. Without loss of generality,
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we number these firms consecutively 1, 2, · · · , N so that firm 1 is the most upstream (the first
or start) firm and thus firm N is the most downstream (the last or end) firm. As a result,
firm 1 has only one (downstream) neighbor, firm 2, and firm N has also only one (upstream)
neighbor, firm N − 1.
2.2 Firm performance
In our stylized supply chain model, each firm’s operational performance can be one of three
states that we rate as bad, normal, and good, designated by 0, 1 and 2, respectively. We denote
the state of firm i at period t by si(t) ∈ {0, 1, 2}, where i = 1, 2, · · · , N and t = 1, 2, · · · , T .
Parameter T indicates the simulation periods of each run. The supply chain’s performance at
period t is
S(t) =
N∑
i=1
si(t).
Accordingly, our model is a discrete dynamic system with discrete and integral space, time,
and states (see Robertson and Caldart, 2009).
A firm’s state can change due to an unanticipated disaster. Suppose that a disaster occurs.
A bad state (0) represents major damage to terminal facilities and/or halted production. At the
other extreme, a good state (2) indicates restored operations from disruptions, which represents
the firm functioning well. The normal state (1) represents the intermediate status whereby
day-to-day operations are not fully recovered yet still functional, for instance, the firm utilizes
supply chain collaboration, inventory, and/or transportation rerouting to remain operational
(Transportation Report Board, 2012).
For the sake of simplicity, each firm in the supply chain at each period has a probability
f of being derailed when encountering an operations shutdown from “severe” disasters and a
probability g of being affected by “mild” disasters. Note that our study focuses on sudden-onset
disasters that arrive rapidly with little or no forewarning, such as tsunamis, earthquakes, acts
of war, and terrorist attacks; slow-onset disasters such as famines and droughts are not sudden
onset and thus are not considered in this study (Van Wassenhove, 2006; Iakovou et al., 2014).
Specifically, upon encountering a mild disaster at period t, firm i’s operational performance is
ξi(t) = max{si(t− 1)− 1, 0};
during disruption from a severe disaster at period t, firm i’s operational performance post
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disaster at that time is
ξi(t) = 0,
irrespective of its state prior to encountering the disaster, si(t− 1).
2.3 Recovery strategy
Following CA modeling convention, we assume that each firm’s behavior is controlled by an
identical decision rule, and that this rule uses the firm’s post-disaster state – bad (0), normal
(1), or good (2) – and the post-disaster states of its two adjacent neighbors (upstream and
downstream) to determine the recovery state. Theoretically, a decision rule is a mapping of
each possible input state (i.e., post-disaster performance, ξj(t), j ∈ {i − 1, i, i + 1}) to an
output state (i.e, recovery performance, si(t)) for every firm in the supply chain. A decision
rule thus specifies a supply chain ‘strategy’ to restore every member firm’s performance to its
pre-disruption state following a disaster .
Given that each firm has three possible states, a fully specified rule will map the 27 (= 33)
possible combinations of actions that the firm and its two neighbors can take to achieve the
firm’s new state. Because the rule must designate one of three possible states for each of the
27 situations, 327 possible rules could direct a firm’s behavior. Therefore, searching for optimal
strategies is unrealistic and impractical in most CA models (Miller and Page, 2007). Following
the modeling practice for complex adaptive systems (Miller and Page, 2007; Gintis, 2009), we
choose ten possible rules (or strategies) based on their similarity to real-world decision making
for supply chain recovery activities. Table 1 illustrates the ten decision rules selected, which
determine the state of firm i at period t given ξi(t) ∀i.
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Table 1 Recovery strategies (decision rules) considered.
Mathematical representation Remark
DR1
si(t) = 2. This rule can be considered a radical recovery
strategy to reach the best state recovered
from a disaster-caused disruption. A
real-world example is Japan’s semiconductor
supply chain responding to the 2011
earthquake/tsunami, where each supply chain
firm worked to successfully repair damaged
facilities and fix the electrical power supply
interruptions that had hindered chemical
plants and fabs (SEMI, 2011).
Firm i will return to the good state (2) no
matter what states its upstream and down-
stream neighbors held post disaster.
DR2
si(t) = 2 if This rule can be considered a benchmarking
recovery strategy since it returns a firm to
the best state of its neighboring firms. A
real-world example is following the 2011
earthquake/tsunami when Toyota paid its
workers to help its hard-hit suppliers in
Japan return to functional production,
leading to a quick supply chain disruption
recovery (The Guardian, 11/03/2012).
max{ξi−1(t), ξi(t), ξi+1(t)} = 2; otherwise
si(t) = 1.
Firm i will return to the good state (2) if
it had a good-state neighbor post disaster;
otherwise, the recovery will be to the nor-
mal state (1).
DR3
si(t) = 2 if there are any two j ∈ J =
{i−1, i, i+ 1} such that ξj(t) = 2: at least
two firms have a good state (the value of
2) in the set J ; otherwise si(t) = 1.
This rule is less likely to return a firm to a
good state (2) than DR2. A real-world
example is Entergy New Orleans’s slow
restoration following hurricanes Katrina and
Rita in 2005, when flooding destroyed gas
facilities and equipment of its domiciled
response contractors, and brought massive
damage to its supply chain’s logistics and
communications; that is, both Entergy New
Orleans and its upstream contractors were
not in the good post-disaster state. It took
Entergy New Orleans two years of
bankruptcy protection and numerous efforts
to recover fully.
Firm i will return to the good state (2) if
there are two good-state firms among the
neighbors and itself post disaster; other-
wise, the firm will recover to the normal
state (1).
DR4
si(t) = 2 if ξi−1(t) + ξi(t) + ξi+1(t) = 6;
otherwise si(t) = 1.
This rule is the least likely to return the firm
to a good state (2) compared to DR2 and
DR3. A real-world example: Malaysian
Airline had difficulties in coping with the
catastrophic losses of Flight 370 that went
missing over the Indian Ocean in May 2014
and Flight 17 shot down over Ukraine in July,
2014.
Firm i will return to the good state (2) if
it and both of its adjacent neighbors (up-
and down-stream) had been in a good state
(2) post disaster; otherwise, the firm will
recovery to the normal state (1).
Continued on next page
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Mathematical representation Remark
DR5
si(t) = 1 if ξi−1(t) + ξi(t) + ξi+1(t) = 6;
otherwise si(t) = 2.
A member firm in a supply chain adopting
this rule does not just reinstate what the
disaster had destroyed, but improves the
supply chain over its post-disaster state.
DR5 is similar to DR1 except for one sit-
uation in which firm i’s state will change
from good (2) to normal (1).
DR6
si(t) = max{ξi−1(t), ξi(t), ξi+1(t)}. This rule can be considered a matching
recovery strategy because it matches the
state of its up- and down-stream neighbors.
A real-world example is the Unitited States
Enrichment Corporation (USEC), one of the
biggest suppliers of uranium to Tokyo
Electric Power (TEPCO), who maintains the
Fukushima reactor before the meltdown
caused by Japan’s 2011 earthquake/tsunami.
Its recovery activities were largely
constrained by the lack of demand from the
downstream firm in the supply chain,
TEPCO, and the low market prices.
Firm i will recover to the best post-disaster
state of its adjacent neighbors and of itself.
DR7
si(t) = min{ξi(t) + 1, 2}. This rule can be considered an incremental
recovery strategy. Real-world examples are
small- and medium-size-firms’ recovery
activities that are hindered by no or little
access to capital, resulting in a slower
recovery than expected.
Firm i will recover its post-disaster state
incrementally, going from bad (0) to nor-
mal (1), normal (1) to good (2), or main-
tain the good state (2).
DR8
si(t) = ξi−1(t) if ξi(t) 6= ξi−1(t); otherwise
si(t) = min{ξi(t) + 1, 2}.
A member firm in a supply chain adopting
this rule follows the post-disaster state of its
upstream neighbor. This strategy, similar to
the reverse bullwhip effect, implies that
upstream firms are more powerful to initiate
recovery activities after disasters and this
action will correctly align the rest of the
chain.
Firm i will adjust its recovery state to its
adjacent upstream neighbor’s post-disaster
state when its state differs from that of
its upstream neighbor post disaster; oth-
erwise, the firm will recover its state by
one additional unit.
DR9
si(t) = ξi+1(t) if ξi(t) 6= ξi+1(t); otherwise
si(t) = min{ξi(t) + 1, 2}.
A member firm in a supply chain adopting
this rule follows the state of its downstream
neighbor. This strategy, similar to the
bullwhip effect, assumes that downstream
firms have more power to initiate recovery
activities after disasters.
This rule suggests that firm i will adjust
its recovery state to its immediate down-
stream neighbor’s post-disaster state when
a difference exists between its state and
that of its downstream neighbor post dis-
aster; otherwise, the firm will improve its
state by one unit.
Continued on next page
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Mathematical representation Remark
DR10
si(t) = max{ξi−1(t), ξi+1(t)} if ξi(t) 6=
max{ξi−1(t), ξi+1(t)}; otherwise si(t) =
min{ξi(t) + 1, 2}.
A member firm in a supply chain adopting
this rule follows the post-disaster state of its
neighbor immediately before and after it.
This strategy assumes that firms in the literal
centre of the chain have more power to
initiate recovery activities after disasters.
This rule suggests that firm i will adjust its
recovery state to match the highest post-
disaster state of its adjacent downstream
and upstream neighbors; otherwise, the
firm will improve its state by one unit.
To sum up, a recovery strategy represents a firm’s option to change its state (i.e., operational
performance). The action set, however, is limited and localized to the firm itself and two of
its adjacent upstream and downstream neighbors. In this sense, our model can be viewed as a
modeling framework of behavioral game theory similar to nonlinear dynamic systems, following
the principle of cognitive limits in human and organizational decision-making and judgement
(see Gintis, 2009; Robertson and Caldart, 2009).
2.4 Resource consumption
Undoubtly, a firm needs to consume a degree of resources to increase its post-disaster opera-
tional performance. We thus assume that the firm does not need to consume any resources for
decreases in its performance. The resource consumption function for firm i with post-disaster
state ξi(t) to reach recovery state si(t) is given by:
C(ξi(t), si(t)) =

c1 for ξi(t) = 0 and si(t) = 1,
c2 for ξi(t) = 1 and si(t) = 2,
c3 for ξi(t) = 0 and si(t) = 2,
where c3 is the resource amount spent to recover from a severe disaster at one time unit, c2 is the
resource amount spent to recover from a mild disaster, and c1 is the resource amount needed to
find alternatives, such as another supplier and a substitute route, in order to maintain day-to-
day operations following a severe disaster. We consider six scenarios of resource consumption,
listed in Table 2, where c1, c2, c3 ∈ {1, 2, 10} and c1 6= c2 6= c3. (Results on additional sets of
resource consumption function, C, are available upon request from the corresponding author.
Our results are insensitive to the choice of C in the experiments.)
Specifically, resource consumption scenarios 1 (RC1) and 2 (RC2) illustrate the cases that
restoring a firm to a good state (2) following a major, severe disaster is much more costly than
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Table 2 Six resource consumption scenarios.
  Recovery Degree    
Scenario 0→1 (𝑐!) 1→2 (𝑐!) 0→2 (𝑐!) Graph 
RC1 1 2 10 
 
RC2 2 1 10 
 
RC3 1 10 2 
 
RC4 2 10 1 
 
RC5 10 1 2 
 
RC6 10 2 1 
 
 
recovering from a mild disaster (i.e., c3 > c2); yet it is less expensive to find alternative resources
to carry out day-to-day operations possible (i.e., c3 > c1). The four other resource consumption
scenarios (RC3 – RC6), on the other hand, suggest an innovative option: the use of resources
to respond to severe disasters such that c3 < c1 + c2. That is, member firms in a supply chain
consider the recovery process an opportunity to foster innovation and bring a simple, cheap
response to a disastrous event. For instance, a supply chain might permanently change its
production locations and/or transportation routing after a major disaster because it could be
too much effort to fix them (Transportation Report Board, 2012); hence, a disruption becomes
an impetus for a supply chain’s structural change. In addition, RC3 and RC4 depict cases
that reinstate the disrupted supply chain at a high cost, despite low resource consumption
to maintain day-to-day operations, c2 > c1. A real-world example is the 2012 Evonik plant
explosion in West German that disrupted worldwide automakers’ supply chains dependent
on its specialty resin called PA-12, used to make fuel and brake lines (Simchi-Levi et al.,
2014). Although the automakers in this case utilized their inventories to maintain day-to-day
operations, in general, seeking alternatives to fully recover a compromised production capacity
is highly resource-consuming (BBC, 19/04/2012). Finally, RC5 and RC6 consider that for
some disasters, such as the 9/11 world trade center terrorist attack and Thailand’s 2011 floods,
the region’s destroyed infrastructure and traffic disruptions require an enormous amount of
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resources to restore daily operations; once this step is achieved, it is relatively inexpensive to
recover to the good state (i.e., c1 > c2).
Firm i’s resource amount at period t is Ri(t); there is an increase ∆ in resources per period.
Parameter ∆ can be thought of as a firm’s investment in risk mitigation in each period. So
firm i’s resource level at period t is
Ri(t) =
 Ri(t− 1) + ∆− C(ξi(t), si(t)) if ξi(t) < si(t),Ri(t− 1) + ∆ otherwise.
2.5 Simulating the model
The simulation procedure for the proposed model is as follows. At period 0, we assign the
recovery strategy, the resource consumption scenario, the probabilities of disasters (f and g),
and the initial state for each firm. Since firm 1 has no upstream neighbor and firm N has no
downstream neighbor, we assume that either firm 1’s upstream neighbor or firmN ’s downstream
neighbor is in a good state, or has the value of 2. (This assumption does not impact our
outcomes since these two firms are outside the boundaries of our framework.) The simulation is
executed until time T is reached. Next, we calculate the supply chain’s performance by adding
up the state of each member firm to evaluate the robustness of the ten recovery strategies
employed by the N supply chain firms.
Figure 1 illustrates a recovery procedure at time period t: this simple example of five firms
shows how recovery dynamics operate in our supply chain model. The numbers in the five large
squares in the bottom row stand for state or operational performance, the numbers in the five
small top-row squares present the level of the remaining resources, and the two firms denoted
by circles present firm 1’s upstream supplier and firm 5’s downstream customer. DR2 and RC1
are applied to the recovery strategy and resource consumption scenario; and, each firm obtains
one unit of resource at the start of each time period. Note that recovery actions following a
strategy require adequate resources for implementation; that is, if the resource level is too low
to execute the recovery strategy, the firm will remain in its post-disaster state (see Firm 1 as
an example).
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Fig. 1. Illustrated recovery procedure from time t− 1 to time t.
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2.6 Methodology and justification
Our objective is to consider the model in which recovery strategies reflect popular disaster
response patterns in practice and to capture the interactions among supply chain members,
to assess how such strategies can influence a firm’s seemingly counterintuitive behaviors in
supply-chain dynamics, and particularly in response to unanticipated disasters. Our ultimate
goal is to gain insights into supply-chain emergency management strategies under unanticipated
disaster-caused disruptions. As Robertson and Caldard (2009) note, CA is a dynamic network
found in nature. We simulated our CA model in a MATLAB program.
Davis et al. (2007), Harrison et al. (2007), and Miller and Page (2007) note that when a
study does not aim to predict the outcome of a particular set of equations, as in our study,
a computational model using a set of parameter values is a valid experimental process if it
satisfies the problem’s general conditions and shows a property of general interest. Therefore,
in this study, we employ the best practice for developing management theory through com-
puter simulations and deriving insights for supply chain managers to formulate strategies for
recovering their firms’ operations from disruptions caused by unanticipated disasters.
In practice, supply chain firms’ recovery activities for unanticipated disasters must satisfy
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two prerequisites: 1) desirability (i.e., the motivation to restore operations is reflected in the
recovery strategies considered), and 2) feasibility (i.e., the ability to meet the resource consump-
tion requirements for execution of the recovery strategy). We consider both desirability and
feasibility of the recovery strategies aimed to help supply chains recover from unanticipated
disasters. Our model setting thus mimics the behavioral aspects of supply-chain emergency
management by considering the motivation behind recovery strategies and the limits of re-
source consumption (Sheu, 2007a; 2007b; 2010). In the next section, we unpack the robustness
of recovery strategies for supply chains facing disruptions caused by unanticipated natural and
man-made disasters using a careful computational analysis.
3 Analysis
3.1 Base case
Prior to running an extensive experimental analysis, and based on simulation research practice,
we perform a base case in a pilot study: N = 5, T = 365, Ri(0) = 3, and ∆ = 1. We set g =
134/365 and f = 17/365 for the probabilities of mild and severe disasters occurring during a year
based on Sheffi’s (2007) empirical analysis, thus, these values are also fixed in our experimental
study. Each firm’s operational performance at period 0 is either a good state (“good” setting)
or randomly assigned – bad (0), normal (1), or good (2) – state (“random” setting) for the
outcome reliability. Every parameter instance is repeated 200 times for outcome reliability;
we observe that the firm’s initial state does not significantly impact the robustness of recovery
strategies. Specifically, panels 1 to 3 in Table 3 show the average of supply chain performance
S per period, the average of (S/Smax)× 100% per period, and the standard deviation of S per
period. Smax is the upper bound of supply chain performance, which is 10 (= N × 2) in the
base case.
In the supply chain disruption and emergency management arenas, we are primarily con-
cerned about worst-case-scenarios rather than average and optimistic scenarios of unanticipated
disasters (Tang, 2006). Thus, Table 4 cannot identify which recovery strategy best addresses
routine disruptions and major disruptions caused by unanticipated disasters (e.g., a 7.5 Richter
scale earthquake at a major production plant) because the measure is the average number of all
simulated events across a supply chain. Following risk analysis and management best practices
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(e.g., Myerson, 2004), we address this concern by reporting the 25th percentile, 5th percentile,
and 1st percentile of supply chain performance S among the 200 simulations (see Table 4).
These three performance measures result in very similar ranking outcomes across all the ten
strategies considered. Hence, we use the 1st percentile as the only performance measure to rank
recovery strategies since it provides a strict standard by which to evaluate the performance of
strategies used to recover disruptions caused by unanticipated disasters.
Tables 3 and 4 show that in the base case, only two of the ten strategies, DR1 and DR7,
achieve the first place; that is, they are the most robust recovery strategies. Notice that the
incremental recovery strategy, DR7, is ranked first but only under either RC1 or RC2. The
common characteristic of these two resource consumption scenarios is max{c1, c2, c3} = c3;
that is, to return the firm’s state from a bad to good state after a disaster is highly resource-
consuming. If this condition for resource consumption does not hold, the performance of the
incremental recovery strategy is not as good as most other strategies. Based on our results,
the radical recovery strategy, DR1, can achieve success under many resource consumption
scenarios; that is, it is the most robust strategy because its worst performance still achieves
the top place among nine others. Following this logic, we examine the mean rankings of each
recovery strategy across all six resource consumption scenarios for the robustness analysis. We
find that a highly ranked strategy can effectively restore the supply chain performance following
unanticipated disasters.
3.2 Experimental design
To characterize the range of recovery performance after unpredictable disasters and to assess
the impact of each parameter, we analyze the proposed model under a variety of parameter
instances (Montgomery, 1991). Hence, a full factorial design is employed to explore the proposed
model and to check whether the insights derived from the base case are applicable in other
circumstances as well. We examine 12 (= 2 × 3 × 2) parameter instances consisting of every
combination in Table 5. These parameter instances are selected to provide a wide range of
possible scenarios (i.e., a low-to-high resource increment per period, ∆, a small, medium, or
large supply chain size, N , and short-to-long simulated periods, T ). We run each parameter
instance 200 times to achieve statistical reliability. This computational analysis enables us to
identify the underlying conditions for one recovery strategy to dominate another.
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Table 3 Base case results for the average and standard deviation of supply chain performance
per period.
Good Random Good Random Good Random Good Random Good Random Good Random
DR1 7.606 7.531 9.740 9.651 8.025 8.026 8.175 8.171 10.000 10.000 9.995 9.995
DR2 7.788 7.747 9.198 9.182 7.387 7.387 7.429 7.422 9.670 9.654 9.646 9.653
DR3 5.025 5.010 5.014 5.002 5.016 5.011 5.010 5.004 1.277 1.246 1.274 1.255
DR4 5.003 5.002 4.996 4.992 5.005 7.649 4.998 4.991 1.223 1.217 1.233 1.216
DR5 5.613 5.595 7.024 6.975 7.645 7.649 7.768 7.780 9.072 9.071 9.049 9.060
DR6 7.594 7.591 9.228 9.125 7.362 7.391 7.431 7.431 9.656 9.657 9.652 9.642
DR7 9.619 9.604 9.629 9.623 5.789 5.787 5.169 5.146 8.073 7.957 4.494 4.437
DR8 5.709 5.726 6.272 6.235 5.338 5.332 5.109 5.095 6.443 6.399 6.242 6.207
DR9 5.710 5.694 6.243 6.194 5.340 5.335 5.103 5.106 6.436 6.431 6.235 6.240
DR10 7.136 7.045 8.661 8.632 6.823 6.835 6.863 6.866 9.560 9.555 9.480 9.486
DR1 76.060 75.305 97.400 96.507 80.250 80.255 81.750 81.707 100.00 100.00 99.950 99.951
DR2 77.884 77.473 91.978 91.820 73.870 73.867 74.285 74.224 96.70 96.54 96.459 96.530
DR3 50.251 50.095 50.143 50.015 50.159 50.105 50.099 50.044 12.77 12.46 12.737 12.549
DR4 50.034 50.016 49.961 49.916 50.047 76.486 49.975 49.912 12.23 12.17 12.326 12.163
DR5 56.132 55.947 70.241 69.746 76.449 76.486 77.675 77.796 90.72 90.71 90.494 90.598
DR6 75.943 75.909 92.276 91.252 73.618 73.908 74.305 74.306 96.56 96.57 96.518 96.419
DR7 96.188 96.036 96.287 96.234 57.889 57.871 51.687 51.461 80.73 79.57 44.940 44.367
DR8 57.085 57.255 62.723 62.347 53.382 53.322 51.085 50.954 64.43 63.99 62.418 62.068
DR9 57.101 56.941 62.431 61.936 53.400 53.352 51.032 51.058 64.36 64.31 62.350 62.395
DR10 71.364 70.446 86.606 86.315 68.226 68.349 68.632 68.664 95.60 95.55 94.800 94.859
DR1 0.429 0.527 0.076 0.075 0.156 0.167 0.069 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.006
DR2 0.374 0.385 0.124 0.119 0.257 0.250 0.138 0.147 0.057 0.059 0.069 0.063
DR3 0.020 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.022 0.018 0.014 0.018 0.081 0.075 0.084 0.091
DR4 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.067 0.071 0.074 0.065
DR5 0.218 0.218 0.051 0.050 0.227 0.192 0.048 0.049 0.047 0.048 0.043 0.048
DR6 0.453 0.407 0.122 0.122 0.245 0.245 0.129 0.153 0.059 0.060 0.064 0.068
DR7 0.045 0.052 0.067 0.063 0.049 0.047 0.067 0.062 0.493 0.524 0.611 0.673
DR8 0.365 0.355 0.091 0.091 0.276 0.281 0.111 0.107 0.201 0.189 0.188 0.202
DR9 0.335 0.365 0.088 0.080 0.276 0.274 0.120 0.110 0.189 0.197 0.207 0.212
DR10 0.387 0.362 0.110 0.111 0.282 0.308 0.114 0.122 0.047 0.043 0.073 0.071
Note. "Good" is the good setting where each supply chain firm operations in a good state (2) at period 0. "Random" is the random 
setting where each firm's state is randomly assigned. Each result is an average of 200 runs of 365 period experiments. 
Panel 3. Standard deviation
Panel 1. Average of supply chain performance (S) per period
Panel 2. Average of (S/Smax) × 100% per period
RC1 RC2 RC3 RC4 RC5 RC6
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Table 4 Base case results for the 25th, 5th, and 1st percentiles of supply chain performance
per period and 1st percentile recovery performance ranking of the strategies.
Good Random Good Random Good Random Good Random Good Random Good Random
DR1 7.307 7.169 9.655 9.534 7.977 7.977 8.123 8.121 10.000 10.000 9.992 9.992
DR2 7.566 7.490 9.019 9.012 7.296 7.308 7.332 7.326 9.634 9.618 9.606 9.608
DR3 5.011 5.000 5.003 4.992 5.008 5.003 5.003 4.992 1.218 1.197 1.216 1.192
DR4 5.000 5.000 4.992 4.986 5.000 5.000 4.993 4.984 1.175 1.169 1.186 1.167
DR5 5.492 5.462 6.874 6.826 7.612 7.614 7.736 7.744 9.041 9.034 9.021 9.029
DR6 7.296 7.295 9.060 8.980 7.285 7.306 7.330 7.326 9.615 9.616 9.611 9.599
DR7 9.592 9.570 9.596 9.592 5.743 5.741 5.121 5.099 7.784 7.611 4.078 3.969
DR8 5.462 5.493 6.112 6.049 5.280 5.269 5.033 5.030 6.300 6.271 6.134 6.078
DR9 5.477 5.389 6.056 6.036 5.277 5.282 5.021 5.040 6.312 6.289 6.097 6.110
DR10 6.870 6.781 8.473 8.395 6.748 6.751 6.780 6.789 9.526 9.527 9.441 9.440
DR1 7.003 6.684 9.408 9.353 7.901 7.904 8.067 8.058 10.000 10.000 9.981 9.984
DR2 7.155 7.114 8.738 8.762 7.175 7.203 7.193 7.166 9.575 9.555 9.532 9.540
DR3 5.003 4.997 4.980 4.973 5.000 5.000 4.988 4.980 1.143 1.135 1.153 1.115
DR4 5.000 5.000 4.973 4.969 5.000 5.000 4.978 4.970 1.110 1.101 1.121 1.118
DR5 5.256 5.214 6.648 6.685 7.570 7.563 7.685 7.703 8.995 8.997 8.980 8.982
DR6 6.880 6.945 8.753 8.699 7.155 7.173 7.243 7.174 9.552 9.552 9.536 9.533
DR7 9.544 9.507 9.559 9.543 5.688 5.699 5.056 5.047 7.184 7.040 3.564 3.416
DR8 5.110 5.067 5.789 5.775 5.180 5.189 4.941 4.918 6.125 6.099 5.944 5.859
DR9 5.149 5.164 5.747 5.681 5.208 5.190 4.908 4.927 6.147 6.141 5.907 5.864
DR10 6.529 6.455 8.162 8.092 6.647 6.666 6.675 6.675 9.477 9.480 9.345 9.358
DR1 6.425 6.167 9.280 9.214 7.834 7.837 8.021 8.030 10.000 10.000 9.974 9.975
DR2 6.918 6.871 8.552 8.527 7.095 7.059 7.099 7.086 9.529 9.492 9.433 9.510
DR3 5.000 4.997 4.958 4.948 5.000 5.000 4.978 4.958 1.111 1.101 1.114 1.066
DR4 5.000 5.000 4.963 4.951 5.000 5.000 4.966 4.953 1.069 1.075 1.067 1.088
DR5 5.036 5.041 6.522 6.558 7.512 7.530 7.664 7.675 8.975 8.960 8.927 8.936
DR6 6.488 6.833 8.611 8.440 7.058 7.092 7.156 7.122 9.523 9.500 9.500 9.471
DR7 9.503 9.475 9.523 9.500 5.627 5.638 5.021 5.003 6.843 6.651 2.988 3.032
DR8 4.907 4.943 5.573 5.488 5.141 5.123 4.870 4.833 5.956 6.037 5.766 5.689
DR9 4.993 5.012 5.471 5.466 5.174 5.151 4.821 4.818 6.008 5.997 5.733 5.711
DR10 6.051 6.264 7.907 7.912 6.549 6.585 6.606 6.611 9.451 9.462 9.277 9.307
DR1 4 5 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
DR2 2 2 4 3 3 4 4 4 2 3 3 2
DR3 7 9 10 10 9 9 7 7 9 9 9 10
DR4 7 8 9 9 9 9 8 8 10 10 10 9
DR5 6 6 6 6 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5
DR6 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 3
DR7 1 1 1 1 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 8
DR8 10 10 7 7 8 8 9 9 8 7 6 7
DR9 9 7 8 8 7 7 10 10 7 8 7 6
DR10 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4
Note. Each result is based on 200 runs of 365 period experiments.
Panel 4. Ranking of recovery strategy
Panel 3. The 1st percentile 
Panel 1. The 25th percentile 
Panel 2. The 5th percentile 
RC1 RC2 RC3 RC4 RC5 RC6
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Table 5 Parameter instances used in our simulation experiments.
 
 
Parameter Values 
∆  for resource 1, 10 
N  for size 3, 5, 10 
T  for period 365 days (1 year), 3650 days (10 years) 
 
Table 6 shows the impact of each experiment factor (parameter ∆, N , or T ) on recovery dy-
namics among the ten recovery strategies. We highlight the parameters that lead to significant
differences in the performance ranking of recovery strategies at p < 0.05. We find that chain
size (N) has the greatest impact on the ranking of recovery strategies (seven p-values are less
than 0.05; three are not: DR1, DR3, and DR4) over the other two factors, resource increment
(∆) and time (T ). Chain size has both positive and negative effects on supply chain perfor-
mance and the resulting ranking of recovery strategies; for instance, chain size has the strongest
positive effect in DR7 and DR5 as it increases their ranking by 1.313 (= 5.521 − 3.208) and
0.771 (= 5.625−4.854), respectively. Chain size has the strongest negative effect in DR8, DR9,
and DR6, as it decreases their ranking by 1.063 (= 8.021− 6.958), 0.979 (= 8.125− 7.146), and
0.791 (= 3.812−3.021), respectively. This suggests that when the chain size grows larger, DR5
and DR7 will generate better supply chain performance. In contrast, strategies that depend on
the good state of adjacent neighbors (up- and down-stream) as a reference, such as DR6, DR8
and DR9, will lead to inferior supply chain performance.
Table 6 also shows that resource increment (∆) is the second most influential moderating
factor, where the effects are significant for DR1, DR5 and DR7 with p < 0.05. The resource
increment appears to have a strong positive effect on DR7 with a 1.513 increase in ranking
and on DR1 with a 0.5 increase. On the other hand, resource increment has a strong negative
moderating effect on DR5 with a 1.472 decrease in ranking. Finally, the time period (T ) has
an insignificant impact (p > 0.05) on the ten recovery strategies’ performance ranking. As a
result, we omit parameter T in our discussion.
To illustrate the ranking of the ten recovery strategies, we provide a boxplot (Figure 2),
where the robustness of each strategy is clearly expressed by its mean and variation in their
performance ranking. For example, DR1 is the most robust recovery strategy for unanticipated
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Table 6 Impact of experimental parameters on the recovery strategy ranking.
Par value DR1 DR2 DR3 DR4 DR5 DR6 DR7 DR8 DR9 DR10
∆ (1) 1.500 2.778 8.625 8.736 4.514 3.444 5.069 7.472 7.694 4.708
(0.993) (0.716) (0.985) (1.492) (2.169) (1.362) (2.661) (1.233) (1.328) (0.458)
(10) 1.000 2.708 9.000 9.139 5.986 3.139 3.556 7.403 7.583 4.528
(0.000) (0.680) (0.000) (0.348) (0.118) (0.997) (1.288) (0.494) (0.496) (0.581)
N (3) 1.188 2.500 8.938 8.729 5.625 3.021 5.521 6.958 7.146 4.312
(0.571) (0.505) (0.522) (1.498) (1.721) (1.695) (2.052) (0.771) (0.743) (0.468)
(5) 1.271 2.625 8.979 9.146 5.271 3.042 4.208 7.333 7.646 4.812
(0.792) (0.761) (0.526) (0.545) (1.594) (0.713) (1.978) (0.630) (0.978) (0.394)
(10) 1.292 3.104 8.521 8.938 4.854 3.812 3.208 8.021 8.125 4.729
(0.849) (0.660) (0.945) (1.019) (1.726) (0.762) (2.021) (1.041) (1.024) (0.574)
T (365) 1.292 2.833 8.681 9.014 5.278 3.278 4.181 7.542 7.736 4.542
(0.759) (0.822) (0.728) (0.911) (1.762) (0.953) (2.381) (1.006) (1.061) (0.580)
(3650) 1.208 2.653 8.944 8.861 5.222 3.306 4.444 7.333 7.542 4.694
(0.730) (0.535) (0.690) (1.259) (1.646) (1.411) (2.048) (0.856) (0.934) (0.464)
Note. The ranking of recovery strategies is based on the 1st percentile of supply chain performance per period
on an average of the six resource consumption scenarios of the good and random initial state settings; each is
based on 200 runs of 12 experiments. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Recovery strategies with smaller
numbers rank higher in supply chain recovery performance, where 1 is the best possible ranking.
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disasters because it has the lowest mean values and a very small variation in ranking, followed
by DR2 and DR6. In contrast, DR3 and DR4 have poor supply chain performance. DR10, DR5
and DR7 have relatively moderate rankings (despite DR7’s very large variations). Table 6 and
Figure 2 illustrate some interesting findings at a more granular level, summarized as follows.
Fig. 2. Boxplot of the 1st percentile performance ranking of recovery strategies.
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The firms using DR1 return to best supply chain performance following unanticipated dis-
asters when they have greater resource increments per period. This is in line with the base-case
result in that DR1 must consume a large amount of resources, and therefore ranks lower under
RC1 and RC2 than under the other four resource consumption scenarios. Yet a small variance
implies it has a consistently high recovery performance under the six RC scenarios. In contrast,
the amount of resources does not play a significant role in DR2 and DR6. These two strategies
are more effective in restoring supply chain performance following unanticipated disasters as
the number of firms in a supply chain decreases from ten to five (or three).
The robustness of DR5 and DR7 is dependent on both the amount of resource increments
and the supply chain size. In DR5, the supply chain’s recovery performance increases as the
chain size increases, yet decreases as the amount of resource increments increases. In contrast,
a large supply chain using DR7 is likely to have better recovery performance when firms receive
20
greater resource increments per period. While the resource impact of DR7 is similar to DR1,
the supply chain’s recovery performance is more sensitive to chain size when the firms in the
supply chain incrementally return to a good state than rapidly and radically returning to a
good state following a disaster.
DR8, DR9, and DR10 show consistent ranking patterns suggesting that the chain size is a
significant factor of influencing supply chain recovery performance, which negatively affects the
performance following unanticipated disasters. This pattern for these three strategies reinforces
our findings observed in strategies DR2 and DR6 that when a supply chain grows larger, if firms
use the state of their adjacent upstream and downstream neighbors as a benchmark, the overall
recovery performance decreases.
Finally, DR3 and DR4 are not responsive to the resource increment and chain size param-
eters, and they are less robust than the other eight recovery strategies that rank 9 and 10 in
average.
4 Robustness of Model and Insights
Thus far, we have examined supply chain performance in which all member firms implement an
identical rule over time based on CA convention. In this section, we extend our model settings to
incorporate plausible real-world situations to investigate the robustness of the findings in Section
3. First, we relax the identical rule assumption and allow member firms to make stochastic
decision rules during the simulation period. Next, we employ a supply network structure where
one member firm has several upstream and downstream neighbors, an extension to the supply
chain structure. These two models further validate our understanding of the robustness of each
proposed recovery strategy against disruptions caused by unanticipated disasters, obtained in
Section 3.
4.1 Stochastic decision rule
This model extension specifies that member firms in a supply chain implement heterogeneous
recovery strategies over time, which impacts the chain’s overall performance. Specifically, we
introduce a new decision rule, DR11, which is a function of the discrete probability distribution
of the ten recovery strategies (Table 1). Supply chain firms that adopt DR11 can change a
selected recovery strategy at each time period based on its recovery performance in the preceding
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Table 7 Impact of experimental parameters on the ranking of the eleven recovery strategies.
Par value DR1 DR2 DR3 DR4 DR5 DR6 DR7 DR8 DR9 DR10 DR11
∆ (1) 1.528 2.944 9.611 10.014 5.347 3.375 5.708 8.472 8.694 5.097 4.972
(1.061) (0.837) (0.972) (1.081) (2.579) (0.926) (3.208) (1.233) (1.328) (0.754) (1.363)
(10) 1.000 2.875 10.000 10.139 6.806 3.306 3.889 8.403 8.583 4.694 5.347
(0.000) (0.711) (0.000) (0.348) (0.432) (0.973) (1.588) (0.494) (0.496) (0.799) (1.620)
N (3) 1.479 2.750 9.521 9.917 5.562 3.104 5.438 8.604 8.812 4.771 5.542
(1.010) (0.786) (0.850) (1.069) (2.475) (0.857) (2.946) (1.180) (1.249) (0.831) (0.743)
(5) 1.188 2.979 10.104 10.292 6.312 3.521 4.417 8.083 8.250 4.875 5.417
(0.673) (0.887) (0.371) (0.544) (1.776) (1.031) (2.916) (0.647) (0.729) (0.761) (1.674)
(10) 1.125 3.000 9.792 10.021 6.354 3.396 4.542 8.625 8.854 5.042 4.521
(0.606) (0.619) (0.713) (0.668) (1.509) (0.917) (2.021) (0.815) (0.850) (0.798) (1.701)
T (365) 1.319 2.833 9.681 10.014 5.861 3.306 4.514 8.542 8.736 4.708 5.861
(0.853) (0.822) (0.728) (0.911) (2.085) (0.988) (2.778) (1.006) (1.061) (0.795) (0.810)
(3650) 1.208 2.986 9.931 10.139 6.292 3.375 5.083 8.333 8.542 5.083 4.458
(0.730) (0.722) (0.678) (0.678) (1.865) (0.911) (2.572) (0.856) (0.934) (0.765) (1.703)
Note. The experimental settings are identical to those in Table 6.
period. The rationale for DR11 is that firms are inclined to choose a recovery strategy that has
been proven effective to restore supply chain performance following a disaster.
DR11 begins with period 0, where member firms select one of the ten strategies, DR1 to
DR10, each strategy with an equal probability 0.1 of being selected. If the chosen strategy
improves supply chain performance from the previous period, then, at period 1 its probability
increases to 0.109, taking 0.001 from each of the other nine (not chosen) strategies. That is, the
probabilities are no longer equally distributed among the ten strategies: one has a probability
of 0.109 and nine have the probability of 0.009. As a result, the proven robust recovery strategy
(the one with probability 0.109) has a larger chance of being chosen again in the subsequent
period. For instance, DR1 is robust in most scenarios (see Figure 2); therefore, DR1 is likely
to become the dominant strategy once it is selected. In contrast, consider a scenario where
a strategy is constantly passed by member firms or fails to generate positive supply chain
performance. Its probability diminishes as time proceeds and will eventually become extinct.
We examine 12 (= 2×3×2) parameter instances consisting of every combination (see Table
5) and analyze the impact of parameters ∆, N and T on the eleven recovery strategies, as
illustrated in Table 7. The patterns in DR1 to DR10 are predominantly consistent with those
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in Table 6, showing the reliability of our chief findings in Section 3. However, different from the
results of those ten strategies, time is a significant factor of DR11. Specifically, member firms
adopting DR11 return to a better recovery performance when the simulated period is 10 years.
Specifically, we observe a large increase in DR11’s performance ranking 1.403 (= 5.861−4.458)
because it takes the robust strategies such as DR1 and DR2 some time to dominate the others
(e.g., DR3 and DR4) and achieve a high supply chain recovery performance. As illustrated in
Figure 3, DR1 ranks higher than DR11, yet DR11 can perform slightly better than DR5 and
DR7. These observations support our main result (in Section 3) – that the radical recovery
strategy (DR1) is most robust in resolving supply chain functioning following unanticipated
disasters.
Fig. 3. Boxplot of the 1st percentile performance ranking of the eleven recovery strategies.
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4.2 Network effect
We now consider a supply network structure including three interactive chains indexed by
k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Each supply chain has size N ; so the entire supply network has size 3N . For
a firm i, in addition to its upstream and downstream neighbors i − 1 and i + 1 in the same
chain, it has two cross-chain neighbors, one in each of the other two chains. For instance,
member firm 3 in chain 2 has four neighbors: firm 2 in chain 2 (upstream neighbor), firm 4 in
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chain 2 (downstream neighbor), firm 3 in chain 1 (cross-chain neighbor), and firm 3 in chain 3
(cross-chain neighbor). We denote the state of firm i in supply chain k at time t as sk,i(t).
To recover from disasters, firm i applies a recovery strategy both within and cross chains so
as to determine its possible state at period t by considering all four neighbors. For example,
with DR2, first within firm i’s supply chain 2, i derives a possible future state by examining
max{ξ2,i−1(t), ξ2,i(t), ξ2,i+1(t)} (see Table 1), denoted as x2,i(t). Next, across the other two
supply chains, firm i derives a second possible future state, denoted as y2,i(t), by examining
max{ξ1,i(t), ξ2,i(t), ξ3,i(t)}. x2,i(t) (y2,i(t)) will return to state 2 if firm i had a good-state
neighbor in the same chain (across the chains); otherwise, firm i will return to state 1, the normal
state. In general, firm i’s state in period t is easily determined if xk,i(t) and yk,i(t) return the
same value. Otherwise, firm i must choose between these two possible future states. Specifically,
it can either act aggressively by striving to attain the best possible recovery performance,
that is, sk,i(t) = max{xk,i(t), yk,i(t)}, or act conservatively by settling on a modest recovery
performance, that is, sk,i(t) = min{xk,i(t), yk,i(t)}. We now examine the robustness of the
ten recovery strategies under these two scenarios, namely network-maximum and network-
minimum.
Table 8 shows the main effects of the experimental factors under the network-maximum
scenario. Similar to the results in the supply chain model (see Table 6), the resource increment
(∆) generates significant impacts on DR1 and DR5, whereas time (T ) does not generate signifi-
cant impacts. The impacts of supply chain size (N), contrary to our early findings in the supply
chain model, are less significant to eight out of the ten recovery strategies in a supply network
model. For instance, in the presence of a supply network, the robustness of DR2, DR6 and DR7
becomes insignificant to chain size. Further, as the resource increment increases, we observe a
positive effect on the supply network performance in DR2. Nonetheless, the overall patterns
in the rankings of recovery strategies are quite similar to that of the supply chain model (see
Figure 2). As illustrated in Figure 4, DR1 remains the most robust recovery strategy, followed
by DR2 and DR6. On the other hand, DR3 and DR4 are again less robust than the other eight
strategies in the supply network model.
Under the network-minimum scenario, results (see Table 9 and Figure 5) show that DR1 is
consistently the best recovery strategy to restore supply network functioning following disas-
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Table 8 Impact of experimental parameters on the ranking of the ten recovery strategies
under the network-maximum scenario.
Par value DR1 DR2 DR3 DR4 DR5 DR6 DR7 DR8 DR9 DR10
∆ (1) 1.653 2.875 9.083 9.597 4.361 3.014 5.792 6.736 7.264 4.486
(1.224) (0.711) (0.599) (0.548) (1.802) (0.813) (2.950) (0.787) (0.919) (0.605)
(10) 1.000 2.375 9.000 9.583 5.194 2.556 5.833 6.972 7.972 3.986
(0.000) (0.516) (0.000) (0.496) (0.399) (0.500) (0.411) (0.236) (0.165) (0.118)
N (3) 1.354 2.625 9.104 9.312 5.021 2.688 5.750 6.792 7.417 4.208
(1.000) (0.640) (0.371) (0.468) (1.495) (0.803) (2.198) (0.504) (0.794) (0.459)
(5) 1.333 2.604 9.104 9.646 4.646 2.896 6.021 6.792 7.500 4.208
(0.930) (0.707) (0.371) (0.483) (1.329) (0.692) (2.168) (0.544) (0.652) (0.582)
(10) 1.292 2.646 8.917 9.812 4.667 2.771 5.667 6.979 7.938 4.292
(0.849) (0.668) (0.498) (0.491) (1.260) (0.627) (1.950) (0.699) (0.697) (0.459)
T (365) 1.403 2.667 8.986 9.639 4.722 2.861 5.736 6.889 7.556 4.222
(1.002) (0.712) (0.459) (0.539) (1.386) (0.775) (2.320) (0.683) (0.785) (0.562)
(3650) 1.250 2.583 9.097 9.542 4.833 2.708 5.889 6.819 7.681 4.250
(0.835) (0.622) (0.381) (0.502) (1.353) (0.638) (1.866) (0.484) (0.709) (0.436)
Note. The experimental settings are identical to those in Table 6.
Fig. 4. Boxplot of the 1st percentile performance ranking of the ten recovery strategies
under the network-maximum scenario.
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Table 9 Impact of experimental parameters on the ranking of the ten recovery strategies
under the network-minimum scenario.
Par value DR1 DR2 DR3 DR4 DR5 DR6 DR7 DR8 DR9 DR10
∆ (1) 1.264 4.444 5.222 5.417 2.972 10.000 2.431 8.417 8.542 5.861
(0.475) (0.785) (0.736) (0.915) (1.736) (0.000) (0.885) (0.496) (0.502) (1.763)
(10) 1.000 5.000 5.778 5.875 3.167 10.000 2.000 9.000 8.000 3.833
(0.000) (0.000) (0.419) (0.555) (0.375) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.375)
N (3) 1.188 4.729 5.479 5.417 3.042 10.000 2.188 8.708 8.250 4.812
(0.445) (0.644) (0.714) (0.846) (1.320) (0.000) (0.734) (0.459) (0.438) (1.553)
(5) 1.125 4.729 5.458 5.708 3.292 10.000 2.208 8.688 8.312 4.750
(0.334) (0.610) (0.651) (0.713) (1.383) (0.000) (0.651) (0.468) (0.468) (1.804)
(10) 1.083 4.708 5.562 5.812 2.875 10.000 2.250 8.729 8.250 4.979
(0.279) (0.617) (0.616) (0.762) (1.024) (0.000) (0.601) (0.449) (0.438) (1.537)
T (365) 1.181 4.694 5.486 5.556 3.028 10.000 2.181 8.708 8.264 4.931
(0.422) (0.620) (0.671) (0.803) (1.311) (0.000) (0.718) (0.458) (0.444) (1.568)
(3650) 1.083 4.750 5.514 5.736 3.111 10.000 2.250 8.708 8.278 4.764
(0.278) (0.622) (0.650) (0.769) (1.205) (0.000) (0.599) (0.458) (0.451) (1.691)
Note. The experimental settings are identical to those in Table 6.
ters. DR7 is the second best recovery strategy to address unanticipated disasters. Despite the
insignificant impact of chain size, the general patterns in the recovery strategy ranking in the
supply network model are similar to those in the supply chain model; a notable difference is
the dramatic decrease of DR6’s ranking (Figure 5). Under the network-minimum scenario, the
additional immediate neighbors in the supply network increase the likelihood of the focal firm
matching a neighbor with a bad state (0), which is responsible for DR6’s poor performance and
low ranking. This finding is consistent with the insights identified in Section 3: as the number
of member firms in the system increases, if firms use the state of their adjacent neighbors as a
benchmark, then the system’s overall recovery performance decreases.
In summary, the chief insights we derived from Section 3 are generally consistent with the
extensions of the stochastic decision rule and the supply network structure.
5 Case study and model validation
In this section, we use the case of Taiwan’s 2011 food contamination scandal to validate our
findings on the robustness of supply chain recovery strategies in a real-world setting. This food
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Fig. 5. Boxplot of the 1st percentile performance ranking of the ten recovery strategies
under the network-minimum scenario.
DR1 DR2 DR3 DR4 DR5 DR6 DR7 DR8 DR9 DR10
2
4
6
8
10
R
an
k
safety scandal arose when Taiwan’s health department discovered that upstream firms had used
an industrial plasticizer, DEHP, rather than the customary palm oil in food and drinks as a
clouding agent and to reduce costs (Economist, 11/06/2011). Evidence shows that repeated
exposure to DEHP among children could lead to cancer and developmental problems as it
affects hormones. The customers, both locally and globally, stopped buying those contaminated
products and were in shock and panic about the fact that these two firms’ immoral conduct had
gone unnoticed for two decades. The discovery and ensuing embargo on the contaminated foods
severely damaged major food and drink supply chains in Taiwan; the food contaminated an
estimated 780 products including beverages, soda fruit juices, sports drinks, tea, jam, syrups,
health supplements, pastries, and yoghurt powder (Taipei Times, 05/06/2011).
5.1 Background and parameter settings for the case study
The food scandal was exposed on May 23, 2011, affecting five echelons of member firms, the
DEHP supplier, emulsifier supplier who substituted palm oil with the toxic plasticizer (Yu
Shen Chemical Co.), food ingredient supplier (Seicheng Biotechnology Group), manufacturer
(Triko Foods Co.), and retailer (7-Eleven), i.e., N = 5. As the downstream firms claimed
innocence, their investment in mitigating food safety risk was small or ∆ = 1. Taiwan’s health
department had carried out a large-scale domestic food inspection for approximately one month
27
from May 23 until June 18, 2011 (T = 27), up to 465,638 bottles of DEHP-tained beverages
had been taken off from shelves, after which the department declared that food products should
be relatively safe.
In order to amid the food safety scares, the supply chain firms took a radical strategy
(i.e., DR1) to restore customer confidence. Specifically, the manufacturer immediately stopped
production and sales of all of its manufacturing processes, recalled the tailed products and
voluntarily submitted their products to government inspectors for DEHP test; the retailer
pulled the tailed products from its shelves without sending the foods through DEHP tests. The
manufacturer and retailer’s rapid, radical, yet costly recovery actions of pulling off the food
enabled them to maintain day-to-day operations. However, this hazardous event had dented
Taiwan’s once good reputation as a reliable and safe exporter of food. Several countries banned
Taiwanese food imports, such as Malaysia (which lifted its import restriction in March 2012)
and Singapore (which dropped its restrictions in March 2012). So, reinstating the supply chain’s
reputations worldwide cost even more than the actions of pulling off the food, i.e., c1 < c2. A
fundamental and cheap solution was available when the government enforced new food safety
regulations – The manufacturer and retailer knocked out the unscrupulous emulsifier supplier
and replaced it with other reliable firms. This case study’s resource consumption scenario is
similar to RC4 so we adopt it in the section. Based on the above information, we use this case
to verify our findings, obtained by our formal modeling, on the robustness of recovery strategies
for restoring supply chain performance following this specific disaster.
5.2 Model validation
Figure 6 illustrates the supply chain recovery performance based on the parameter settings
considered in the Taiwan food disaster case study. In addition to the adopted radical recovery
strategy (DR1), we also include the recovery performance resulting from the five next best
strategies, including DR2, DR5, DR6, DR7, and DR8.
It is clear that DR1 is more effective and robust than the other five strategies in the Taiwan
food disaster case in terms of restoring supply chain’s performance following the disaster. In
other words, a supply chain is more likely to return to its pre-disrupted condition when using
DR1. This result is in line with the findings in Figure 2: the radical recovery strategy, in
general, dominates other strategies (e.g., DR2, DR5, and DR6) in which firms use their neigh-
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Fig. 6. Simulating 1st percentile supply chain performance under the six top recovery
strategies for the case study of Taiwan’s 2011 food scandal.
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Note. The parameters used in the Taiwan food disaster case study are N = 5, ∆ = 1, T = 27, f = 17/365. A
small ∆ can also mean that when food supply chains encounter a safety disaster, they rarely receive
government or humanitarian support for recovery. si(0) = 0 and RC4 is applied.
bors’ state as a reference. In fact, the Taiwan’s food supply chain recovered well from this
disaster by containing the devastated impact to the emulsifier supplier by quickly excluding
them from the supply chain. We can predict that an incremental strategy, DR7, which carries
out recovery activities in a gradual manner, does not reinstate consumers’ confidence as well
as other strategies, as evidenced by the low ranking in Figure 6. Likewise, strategies such as
DR8, in which firms adjust only to the state of one upstream firm (in the Taiwan case, that
would be the dishonest supplier), would halt the entire supply chain. In summary, as the main
insight generated in our formal analysis, the radical recovery strategy, DR1, is most effective
in preventing a crisis from escalating and in recovering the supply chain to a good state.
6 Discussion and conclusion
The simulation outcomes, illustrated in Figures 2 to 5, suggest that DR1 is the most effective
strategy for recovering from unanticipated disasters (since we consider only the 1st percentile
results as our performance measure). Results also suggest a rather small variation in DR1’s
performance ranking in comparison to the other nine strategies. Consistent with Chopra and
Sodhi’s (2014) strategy on regionalizing the supply chain, the radical recovery strategy DR1
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will mitigate the negative impact of disruptions caused by unanticipated disasters within the
affected region so that one bad-state firm will not drag the entire supply chain down. In other
words, the supply chain becomes less fragile as the devastating impact of a disruption will be
halted quickly, and will not spread to all member firms. Table 6 shows that the robustness of
DR1 increases in resource increments per period (parameter ∆). Table 4 reports no clear rela-
tionship between the initial states of firms (i.e., either good or randomly assigned) and supply
chain performance following the disasters. From this, we can infer that recovery strategies have
a greater impact on supply chain performance than do resource consumption scenarios and the
firms’ initial states. Drawing on these findings, we propose the following observations:
Observation 1a. A supply chain is robust against disruptions from unanticipated disasters if
each supply chain member employs a radical recovery strategy aimed to return to a good state
following a disruption.
Observation 1b. The robustness of the radical recovery strategy increases with resource in-
crement.
Our analysis statistically demonstrates that the radical strategy (DR1) is the most effective
among the nine others for supply chains striving to recover from an unanticipated disaster,
no matter how serious the disaster is. However, using the radical strategy may be unrealistic
in practice due to the high level of resource consumption (high costs) that a firm must invest
in order to return to a good state after a disruption (i.e., in RC1 and RC2). Therefore, we
search for alternative recovery strategies under scenarios RC1 and RC2. We first consider DR7
that firms take recovery activities incrementally. We find that it generates the best recovery
performance among the ten strategies (see panel 4 of Table 4). In other words, DR7 is quite
effective in recovering from extreme disasters when the recovery process that involves changing
a firm’s state from bad (0) to good (2) requires plenty of resources. If this resource consumption
condition does not hold, the performance of the incremental recovery strategy is not as good
as most other recovery strategies. Also, we find that the robustness of DR7 increases as the
chain size (N) increases, as shown in Table 6. Formally,
Observation 2a. Supply chain performance following unanticipated disasters is sensitive to
resource consumption requirements for recovery when an incremental recovery strategy is em-
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ployed by each supply chain member.
Observation 2b. The robustness of an incremental recovery strategy increases as the size of
the supply chain increases.
We now consider DR2, the benchmarking recovery strategy. Similar to DR7, we find that
DR2 can perform well under RC1 or RC2 (for details, see panels 3 and 4 of Table 4 and Figure
2). We should note that the strategic intent of DR2 is quite different from that of DR7. When
facing a disruption, a good-state firm using DR2 will remain good (2); a normal- or bad-state
firm will regain its good state if either of its adjacent neighbors – the upstream or downstream
firm – has a good state (2). As reported in Table 6, benchmarking recovery strategy leads to
better performance following unanticipated disasters when the chain size is small. This leads
to the next observation,
Observation 3a. A supply chain is robust against disruptions caused by unanticipated disasters
if firms employ a recovery strategy using the strategy of at most one neighboring firm with good
performance as a benchmark to improve their operational performance following a disruption.
Observation 3b. The robustness of the benchmarking recovery strategy in a supply chain
decreases as the chain size increases.
The insights from the analysis and discussion are distilled into a conceptual framework in
Figure 7, which provides managerial insights in the demarcating regions of robustness of a
supply chain’s various recovery strategy options. Specifically, the radical strategy is the best
recovery option for scenarios in which the resource consumption requirements are relatively low
for recovery activities from a bad state (0) to a good state (2). A benchmarking strategy is a
good option for a small supply chain with high recovery resource needs. When the supply chain
size is large and the recovery resource consumption requirements are high, the use of incremental
recovery strategy among member firms in a supply chain is expected to outperform all the nine
other strategies.
This paper contributes to the literature by examining the robustness of practical supply
chain strategies for recovering from unanticipated disasters in a dynamic setting. We develop a
supply chain model of unanticipated disasters using cellular automata (CA), a complex adap-
tive system found in nature (Miller and Page, 2007). The proposed CA model incorporates
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Fig. 7. Robust supply chain recovery strategies.
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the spirit of behavioral game theory as do past studies (e.g., Xiao and Yu, 2006; Ginits, 2009)
and the key features extracted from real-world supply chain recovery activities (e.g., Kunz and
Reiner, 2012; Transportation Report Board, 2012). Our stylized, behavioral model depicts the
dynamic evolution of supply chain performance under the disruptive threat of unpredictable
disasters. Through carefully chosen computational analysis, we uncover the weaknesses of pop-
ular incremental strategies for supply chain recovery when the chain size is relatively small. We
further find that supply chain member firms using a radical recovery strategy can help main-
tain a positive supply chain performance over time. Counterintuitively, playing strategically
for recovery by looking at what one’s neighbors do in a large supply chain may hurt the entire
supply chain’s performance in the long run.
As for future research, this study can be extended in several directions. First, our formal
model can be extended to consider the supply chain as an evolving system so that member
firms can restore supply chain operations following unanticipated disasters by adding and/or
removing a member (i.e., flexible chain size) over time. Second, further empirical research
could test our observations in different industries (i.e., logistic, semiconductor, service) with
real disaster dataset (e.g., www.emdat.be; www.airdisaster.com) and analyze whether other
novel recovery strategies could effectively improve supply chain performance. We believe that
the analytical observations and managerial framework derived from our results provide rich
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insights into supply chain emergency management facing unanticipated disasters and lay the
groundwork for future analytical and empirical studies in this increasingly important field.
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